Many people in the Philippines, especially in the defense and foreign policy establishment, want the VFA to continue. On February 6, 2020, Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. said at a Philippine Senate hearing that the continuation of the agreement was “more beneficial” to the Philippines than its end. Some supporters are trying to avoid President Duterte`s action. On February 10, the Philippine Senate passed a resolution asking the president to reconsider his intention to repeal the agreement, and on March 2, it passed a resolution asking the Supreme Court to decide whether the Senate should approve the termination of the treaty, which policymakers said is unclear. The presidential palace has hinted that it will settle a Supreme Court decision in this matter. On February 2, 2020, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte officially announced at the U.S. Embassy in Manila that he would terminate the pact, the termination will take effect in 180 days, unless otherwise agreed during this period. In the past, Duterte has admired both Russian forces and the Chinese People`s Liberation Army, although the Philippines and China are involved in a dispute over sovereignty over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.  In June 2020, the Philippine government reversed this decision and announced the continuation of the agreement.
 What is this agreement and why is it so important for the United States? Here`s what you need to know. Will Duterte really end VFA? According to most reports, he remains seriously in his will to eliminate the agreement. But here`s why the VFA and the U.S.-Philippines Alliance could survive the Dutertes firestorm. Second, it is unclear whether the president has the constitutional power to repeal an international agreement ratified by the Philippine Senate. Senators still disagree on whether Duterte can unilaterally denounce the VFA and have even proposed that the Supreme Court weigh in on the legality of Duterte`s decision. At a time when this access is doubtful, it is worth checking the impact of its loss. If, hypothetically, the loss of the VFA marks the beginning of a chain reaction that, encouraged by Chinese pressure, ends with the dissolution of the MDT, the expulsion of US forces and the denial of future access, what would that mean for US operations? For the most part, the loss of Philippine bases is putting operational and logistical pressure on four other major operating sites: South Korea, Japan (mainland and Okinawa), Australia and Guam. As a result, the size, speed and nature of the armed forces engaged in the South China Sea and Taiwan conflicts would change for two main reasons: one political and the other logistical. My research explains that VFA itself is a product of past alliances.